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Introduction
The emergence of the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak
in West Africa threatens regional and global public health
security. This epidemic, first announced in March 2014 in
Guinea Conakry, has grown dramatically since June 2014
with an extension into Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria,
Mali, and Democratic Republic of the Congo were also
transiently affected. It was declared to be a public health
emergency of international concern by the World Health
Organization (WHO) on 8 August 2014. On 21 January
2015, a cumulative total of more than 21,800 cases was
reported by the WHO [1], with a case fatality rate (CFR)
of between 57 and 59 % among hospitalized patients. A
total of 828 healthcare workers (HCWs) have been in-
fected with the Ebola virus since the beginning of the
epidemic, with a CFR of 60 %. Some Western countries
have also reported imported cases: six patients in the
USA, Spain and UK, including one death (CFR of
16.7 %). Direct contact with infected bodily fluids—
usually feces, vomit, or blood—is necessary for trans-
mission. Once the Ebola virus is suspected, based on
national versions of WHO’s case definition recommen-
dations [2], specific laboratory tests can confirm or
disprove diagnoses in a few hours, but for this, the patient
has to be transported to a specialized center with specific
management conditions [3]. In this article, the authors
compared procedures for the transport of Ebola patients in
their respective countries (USA, UK, and France) to
identify common principles.
National guidelines for transportation of patients
with suspected or known EVD
Although the epidemic is largely confined to West Africa,
most Western countries where there is a possible risk of
imported EVD have developed guidelines and procedures
for the transport of confirmed or suspected cases of EVD.
Specific recommendations are informed by risk for ex-
posure to EVD. In the USA, the Interagency Board for
Equipment Standardization and Interoperability describes
a spectrum of risks based on patient symptomology and
application of personnel protective equipment (PPE) to
accommodate the level of risk [4]. This spectrum of risks
is also acknowledged in the US Center for Disease Con-
trol’s guidance [5] for emergency department and
emergency medical services (EMS) evaluation and man-
agement of patients with possible EVD. In the UK, the
Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP)
advises a stratified risk approach based on simple
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symptomatology [6] that guides the healthcare profes-
sionals to the appropriate level of personal protective
equipment. In France, transportation conditions were de-
scribed in a document written by emergency specialists
[7], being currently updated by infectious disease and
hygiene specialists.
Patient circumstances (possible or confirmed cases,
severity of illness)
The clinical features of EVD are increasingly well de-
scribed in the literature [8–10]. Symptoms of the patients to
transport vary, and precautions must take into account the
patient’s condition and the risk they pose to transporting
clinicians. To simplify the risk assessment and organization
of transportation that follows (presented in Table 1), two
sorts of patients have been identified: a possible Ebola pa-
tient with few symptoms apart from fever can be considered
to have a low risk of transmission (case 1 in Table 1), and a
patient with symptoms of profound diarrhea and vomiting,
bruising, and bleeding or one with confirmed EVD several
days into the course of their illness poses a substantial risk
of transmission to transporting clinicians (case 2 in
Table 1). An appropriate care plan should be developed for
each patient journey, including the need for intravenous
access [11], according to the clinical data available.
Personnel (team composition, training)
Composition of transfer unit/team
Composition of the transport team varies by country. In the
US, personnel should at a minimum be capable of safe
carriage of nonambulatory patients and providing basic life
support measures. Advanced life-support skills, such as fluid
and electrolyte replacement, and management of hypoten-
sion and cardiac dysrhythmias may be warranted based on
the patient’s clinical condition and availability of staff with
the requisite skill set. Health systems in the USA identified
as capable of managing a patient through a full course of
EVD have developed partnerships with local EMS agencies
with the requisite competencies. In the UK, only high-risk
patients need to be transported with medical staff (with two
clinicians and a transfer officer). In France, transportation
conditions are managed by the Service d’Aide Me´dicale
d’Urgence (SAMU), which is the prehospital emergency
medical system, in each department of France. Overall
choices in the SAMU have evolved from a prehospital team
that could have no medics to a highly skilled team capable
of medical transfers regardless of the clinical status of the
patient. HCWs with underlying conditions such as preg-
nancy, asthma, and claustrophobia are excluded.
Adequate training of HCWs is essential, with the
following recommended requirements: prior to transport
of a possible or infected Ebola patient, all healthcare
workers must receive repeated training and have
demonstrated competency in performing all required in-
fection-control practices and procedures; repeated
practice in donning/doffing of proper PPE is indispens-
able for the development and demonstration of
competence; the overall safe management of Ebola pa-
tients is best executed with observation/supervision of the
critical actions required of the transport team.
Equipment (PPE, vehicle)
PPE for HCWs and patients
Personal protective equipment should reflect the condition
of the patient, work environment, operational objectives,
and competencies of the transport team to apply it. Ac-
cording to the clinical status and national choices, several
suits can be used. The minimum PPE, which can be
designated as ‘‘low grade,’’ includes at a minimum gloves
to protect the hands, a gown or coverall to protect the
clothing, and a mask/face shield to protect the mucous
membranes. ‘‘High-grade’’ PPE involves a robust visor in
addition to a fluid repellent suit, boots, double gloves,
face mask, and head protection. There are also positive-
pressure suits (PPS), which have the advantage of ex-
cellent protection, superior comfort and vision. These
very expansive PPSs are available in Germany, for ex-
ample, but reserved to specific circumstances in
specialized treatment centers [11]. Whatever the PPE
chosen, the staff needs to be confident and competent in
wearing it and its safe removal. Training as well as
practicing each step of the procedure is a must, with the
external control of a supervisor. The patient is also most
often dressed in a single-use outfit and mask. Supple-
mentary isolation inside a slipcover or caisson has been
adopted by some for patients regarded as high risk for
transmission of the virus.
Vehicle equipment
In the US, standard ambulance equipment is used, but
shielded with impervious barrier drapes for symptomatic
patients. Sometimes another vehicle can escort the
dedicated vehicle to assure logistic support and external
supervision. In the UK, for a low-risk patient a standard
ambulance is used, but for high-risk patients specialist
HART staff will use a stripped out ambulance with
minimal equipment, and taped up cupboards are used to
facilitate cleaning and reduce the amount of equipment
that may need to be destroyed. In France, the SAMU
regions are autonomous and have different plans: mostly,
a stripped out vehicle has been dedicated, and minimal















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Donning and cleaning procedures
The staff involved in the patient episode need to be
trained, equipped, and practiced in wearing and removing
the PPE safely. In the USA, transporting teams have fa-
cilitated decontamination and disinfection by isolating the
driver compartment from the patient compartment and
use of impervious drapes. In our countries, the ambulance
staff who transport the patient will perform the decon-
tamination and disinfection of the vehicle cabin using
hypochlorite solution or a registered disinfectant. In
France, a vaporization of hydrogen peroxide or another
virucidial gas is usually applied secondarily. Moreover, in
the UK, the vehicle is subsequently taken for a specialist
deep cleaning prior to reuse.
Perspectives
Public health measures such as early isolation and infec-
tion control are necessary from the earliest suspicion of
EVD, and the transportation of patients includes some risk.
In West Africa, Ebola patient transportation has been a
source of secondary cases because of the absence of a
robust ‘‘prehospital’’ health system, leading to trans-
portation of patients mostly by their families, without
implementation of infection control measures. However,
safe transportation of Ebola patients by non-governmental
organizations as ‘‘Doctors without borders’’ are organized.
Guidelines of Western countries do not seem to be relevant
in Africa, because of the healthcare worker/patient ratio,
expensive costs of safety measures (number of vehicles
and protective equipment for personnel), and the absence
of prehospital organization. In the US, countless numbers
of possible patients have been transported and evaluated,
none of whom were confirmed to have the disease. Ten
patients with confirmed EVD have been transported by
EMS. In France, up to now, 22 possible patients have been
transported in accordance with the guidelines described
here, none of whom were confirmed, and 2 EVD patients
were transported in a medical evacuation.
Development of point-of-care tests to quickly disprove
the diagnosis of infection with Ebola virus [12] could
strongly reduce the number of specialized and compli-
cated transports and thus the risk of secondary infection.
Possible EVD with 
few symptoms
Confirmed EVD* –
Possible EVD many symptoms
•High grade PPE
robust visor in addition to a fluid repellent suit, 
boots, double gloves, face mask and head protection
•Consider Caisson for patient isolation
*time of clinical course can be considered










Specialized medical teamSimple ambulance with
trained rescuers**
Low grade PPE
minimum gloves to protect the hands
a gown or coverall to protect clothing,
and a mask/face shield to protect
mucous membranes
Practice donning and doffing
Test procedures
Perspective from the authors
Fig. 1 Transportation of Ebola patients
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Conclusion
Comparison of our three countries’ guidelines highlights
the importance of key principles that are necessary for a
trained team [13] to improve their performance in stress
conditions and avoid possible fatal mistakes, including
the necessity of detailed procedures concerning doffing
and disinfection, as well as risk assessment for each
situation, with procedures adapted to local circumstances
and the patient’s clinical presentation (Fig. 1). This
guidance is continuing to evolve to accommodate new
data and experience.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which
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